Dialectical Argument Structure | Structure & Surprise

 

dialectic argument

Dialectic definition is - logic. How to use dialectic in a sentence. 4 a: the Hegelian process of change in which a concept or its realization passes over into and is preserved and fulfilled by its opposite also: the critical investigation of this process. The dialectical argument structure proved to be the most difficult of the structures we looked at during the workshop, in part because it is a three-part structure, and in part because it is not a structure that poets tend to use as often as others. Dialectic resembles debate, but the concept excludes subjective elements such as emotional appeal and the modern pejorative sense of rhetoric. Dialectic may be contrasted with the didactic method, wherein one side of the conversation teaches the other. Dialectic is alternatively known as minor logic, as opposed to major logic or critique.


Dialectic | Definition of Dialectic by Merriam-Webster


According to the logic of a traditional reductio ad absurdum argument, if the premises of an argument lead to a contradiction, we must conclude that the premises are false—which leaves us with no premises or with nothing. We must then dialectic argument around for new premises to spring up arbitrarily from somewhere else, and then see whether those new premises put us back into nothingness or emptiness once again, dialectic argument, if they, too, lead to a contradiction.

Because Hegel believed that reason necessarily generates contradictions, as we will see, he thought new premises will indeed produce further contradictions. As he puts the argument, dialectic argument. Hegel provides the most extensive, general account of his dialectical method in Part I of his Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Scienceswhich is often called the Encyclopaedia Logic [EL]. The moment of understanding sublates itself because its own character or nature—its one-sidedness or restrictedness—destabilizes its definition and leads it to pass into its opposite.

The dialectical moment thus involves a process of self -sublation, or a process in which the determination from the moment of understanding sublates itselfor both cancels and preserves dialectic argumentas it pushes on to or passes into its opposite. Here, Hegel rejects the traditional, reductio ad absurdum argument, which says that when the premises of an argument lead to a contradiction, then the premises must be discarded altogether, leaving nothing.

As Hegel suggests in the Phenomenologysuch an argument. Although the speculative moment negates the contradiction, it is a determinate or defined nothingness because it is the result of a specific process. There is something particular about the determination in the moment of understanding—a specific weakness, or some specific aspect that was ignored in its one-sidedness or restrictedness—that leads it to fall apart in the dialectical moment. SL-M Rosen 30; Stewartdialectic argument, 41—3; Winfield Instead, the movement to new determinations is driven by the nature of the earlier determinations.

Indeed, for Hegel, the movement is driven by necessity see, e. The nature of the determinations themselves drives or forces them to pass into their opposites, dialectic argument. This sense of necessity —the idea that the method involves being forced from earlier moments to later ones—leads Hegel to regard his dialectics as a kind of logic. Second, because the form or determination that arises is the result of the self-sublation of the determination from the moment of understanding, dialectic argument, there is no need for some new idea to show up from the outside.

Instead, the new determination or form is necessitated by earlier moments and hence grows out of the process itself, dialectic argument. SL-dG SL-dG 33; cf. On the dialectic argument, the earlier determinations are preserved in the sense that dialectic argument remain in effect within the later determinations, dialectic argument. The something-others must continue to do the work of picking out individual somethings before the concept of Being-for-itself can have its own definition as the concept that gathers them up.

It grasps or captures their character or quality as apples. We can picture the concept of Being-for-itself like this:. Fourth, later concepts both determine and also surpass the limits or finitude of earlier concepts. Earlier determinations sublate themselves —they pass into their others because of some weakness, one-sidedness or restrictedness in their own definitions.

There are thus limitations in each of the determinations that lead them to pass into their opposites. Later determinations define the finiteness of the earlier determinations.

It also rises above those limitations, since it can do something that the concept of a something-other cannot do. Dialectics thus allows us to get beyond the finite to the universal. As Hegel puts it, the result of the dialectical process. Like Being-for-itself, later concepts are more universal because they unify or are built out of earlier determinations, and include those earlier determinations as part of their definitions.

Indeed, many other concepts or determinations can also be depicted as literally surrounding earlier ones cf. Maybee 73,dialectic argument,, Moreover, because the process develops necessarily and comprehensively through each concept, form or determination, there are no determinations that are left out of the process, dialectic argument. This Absolute is the highest concept or form of dialectic argument for that subject matter. It is the thought or concept of the whole conceptual system for the relevant subject matter, dialectic argument.

Maybee 30, :. We can picture the entire system like this cf, dialectic argument. Maybee 29 :. Together, Hegel believes, these characteristics make his dialectical method genuinely scientific. So far, we have seen how Hegel describes his dialectical method, dialectic argument, but we have yet to see how we might read this method dialectic argument the arguments he offers in his works. The logic begins with the simple and immediate concept of pure Being, which is said to illustrate the moment of the understanding.

We can think of Being here as a concept of pure presence. It asserts bare presence, but what that presence is like has no further determination. But if we focus for a moment on the definitions of Being and Nothing themselves, their definitions have the same content. Indeed, both are undetermined, so they have the same kind of undefined content.

The third concept of the logic—which is used to illustrate the speculative moment—unifies the first two moments by capturing the positive result of—or the conclusion that we can draw from—the opposition between the first two moments. The concept of Becoming is the thought of an undefined content, taken as presence Being and then taken as absence Nothingor taken as absence Nothing and dialectic argument taken as presence Being.

Becoming dialectic argument or negates Being and Nothing because it is a new concept that replaces the earlier concepts; but it also preserves Being and Nothing because it relies on those earlier concepts for its own definition.

Dialectic argument, it is the first concrete concept in the logic. Becoming succeeds in having a definition or determination because it is defined by, or piggy-backs on, the concepts of Being and Nothing.

Harris 93—7; Singer 77— On this reading, dialectic argument, Being is the positive moment or thesis, Nothing is the dialectic argument moment or dialectic argument, and Becoming is the moment of aufheben or synthesis—the concept that cancels and preserves, or unifies and combines, Being and Nothing.

There are other places where this general pattern might describe some of the transitions from stage to stage, but there are many more places where the development does not seem to fit this pattern very well, dialectic argument. Stace, for instance, goes on to warn us that Hegel does not succeed in applying this dialectic argument throughout the philosophical system. Hegel here abandons the triadic method. McTaggart []: Some scholars apply the triadic form fairly loosely across several stages e.

Burbidge 43—5; Taylor — For G. The first sense of triplicity echoes the textbook, Being-Nothing-Becoming example. In some triads, the third term obviously mediates between the first two terms. Abstract Purpose is the thought of any kind of purposiveness, dialectic argument the purpose has not been further determined or defined. Maybee — According to the example and model, Abstract Purpose would be the moment of understanding or thesis, Finite Purpose dialectic argument be the dialectical moment or antithesis, and Realized Purpose would be the speculative moment or synthesis.

Since the second determination is different from the first one, it is the logical negation of the first one, dialectic argument, or is not -the-first-determination. Since Finite Purpose, for instance, has a definition or determination that is different from the definition that Abstract Purpose has, it is not -Abstract-Purpose, or is the negation or opposite of Abstract Purpose in that sense. Other problems remain, however. Because the concept of Realized Purpose is defined through a syllogistic process, it is itself the product of several stages of development at least four, by my count, if Realized Purpose counts as a separate determinationwhich would seem to violate a triadic model.

Moreover, the concept of Realized Purpose does not, strictly speaking, seem to be the unity or combination of Abstract Purpose and Finite Purpose.

Realized Purpose is the result of and so unifies the syllogistic process of Finite Purpose, through which Finite Purpose focuses on and is realized in a particular material or content. Realized Purpose thus seems to be a development of Finite Purpose, rather than a unity or combination of Abstract Purpose and Finite Purpose, in the way that Becoming can be said to be the unity or combination of Being and Nothing. For the concept of Being, for example, its moment of understanding is its moment of dialectic argument, in which it is asserted to be pure presence, dialectic argument.

Being thus sublates itself because the one-sidedness of its moment of understanding undermines that determination dialectic argument leads to the definition it has in the dialectical moment, dialectic argument. The speculative moment draws out the implications of these moments: it asserts that Being as pure presence implies nothing.

It even puts Being into a new state as the prefix ent - suggests because the next concept, Nothing, will sublate cancel and preserve Being. The concept of Nothing also has all three moments. When it is asserted to be the speculative result of dialectic argument concept dialectic argument Being, it has its moment of understanding or stability: it is Nothing, defined as pure absence, as the dialectic argument of determination.

Nothing thus sublates itself : since it is an undefined contentit is not pure absence after all, but has the same presence that Being dialectic argument. It is present as an undefined content. Nothing thus sublates Being: it replaces cancels Being, but also preserves Being insofar as it has the same definition as an dialectic argument content and presence that Being had. We can picture Being and Nothing like this the circles have dashed outlines to indicate that, as concepts, they are each undefined; cf.

Maybee 51 :. The dialectical process is driven to the next concept or form—Becoming—not by a triadic, thesis-antithesis-synthesis pattern, but by the one-sidedness of Nothing—which leads Nothing to sublate itself—and by the implications of the process so far. Since Being and Nothing have each been exhaustively analyzed as separate concepts, and since they are the only concepts in play, there is only one way for the dialectical process to move forward: whatever concept comes next will have to take account of both Being and Nothing at the same time.

Moreover, the process revealed that an undefined content taken to be presence i. The next concept, then, takes Being and Nothing together and draws out those implications—namely, that Being implies Nothing, and that Nothing implies Being.

It is therefore Becoming, defined as two separate processes: one in which Being becomes Nothing, and one in which Nothing becomes Being. We can dialectic argument Becoming this way cf. Maybee 53 :. In a similar way, a one-sidedness or restrictedness in the determination of Finite Purpose together with the implications of earlier stages leads to Realized Purpose. I go to a restaurant for the purpose of having dinner, for instance, dialectic argument, and order a salad.

My purpose of having dinner particularizes as a pre-given object—the salad. But this object or particularity—e. We can picture Finite Purpose this way:. In the dialectical moment, Finite Purpose is determined by the previously ignored content, or by that other content. The one-sidedness of Finite Purpose requires the dialectical process to continue through a series of syllogisms that determines Finite Purpose in relation to the ignored content.

 

Definition and Examples of Dialectic in Rhetoric

 

dialectic argument

 

The dialectical argument structure proved to be the most difficult of the structures we looked at during the workshop, in part because it is a three-part structure, and in part because it is not a structure that poets tend to use as often as others. Dialectic resembles debate, but the concept excludes subjective elements such as emotional appeal and the modern pejorative sense of rhetoric. Dialectic may be contrasted with the didactic method, wherein one side of the conversation teaches the other. Dialectic is alternatively known as minor logic, as opposed to major logic or critique. Dialectic definition is - logic. How to use dialectic in a sentence. 4 a: the Hegelian process of change in which a concept or its realization passes over into and is preserved and fulfilled by its opposite also: the critical investigation of this process.